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Abstract
Background: It has been shown that people can only maintain one problem state, or intermediate mental representation, at
a time. When more than one problem state is required, for example in multitasking, performance decreases considerably.
This effect has been explained in terms of a problem state bottleneck.
Methodology: In the current study we use the complimentary methodologies of computational cognitive modeling and
neuroimaging to investigate the neural correlates of this problem state bottleneck. In particular, an existing computational
cognitive model was used to generate a priori fMRI predictions for a multitasking experiment in which the problem state
bottleneck plays a major role. Hemodynamic responses were predicted for five brain regions, corresponding to five
cognitive resources in the model. Most importantly, we predicted the intraparietal sulcus to show a strong effect of the
problem state manipulations.
Conclusions: Some of the predictions were confirmed by a subsequent fMRI experiment, while others were not matched by
the data. The experiment supported the hypothesis that the problem state bottleneck is a plausible cause of the
interference in the experiment and that it could be located in the intraparietal sulcus.
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Introduction
One of the challenges for research on multitasking is to explain
why some tasks can be performed together without a problem
(e.g., talking and walking), while other tasks clearly interfere with
each other (e.g., talking and reading). According to so-called
multiple-resource theories, interference occurs when multiple tasks
require the same cognitive or peripheral resources (e.g., [1–3]). An
obvious example is our visual system: we can only look at one
thing at a time. There is empirical evidence that the same principle
might hold for cognitive resources: for instance indicating that we
can only retrieve one fact at a time from declarative memory (e.g.,
[4]). The impact of a concurrent request to a particular resource
depends on the time scale of multitasking: whether it is truly
concurrent multitasking (e.g., driving and calling), or whether the
task can be characterized as ‘sequential multitasking’ (e.g., writing
a paper and answering the phone; [5]).
A resource that causes considerable interference in both
concurrent and sequential multitasking is the problem state
resource. This resource is used for maintaining intermediate task
representations. For instance, when mentally solving the algebra
problem 3x210=2 it is used to store 3x=12 (e.g., [6]). In a series
of experiments we have shown that the problem state resource acts
as a bottleneck in sequential multitasking [7]. When multiple tasks
needed to store intermediate results, interference was observed.
However, when only one of the tasks required access to
intermediate results, no interference was found. To account for
these experimental results, we developed a computational
cognitive model that showed that a ‘problem state bottleneck’
could explain the behavioral data.
The goal of this paper is to explore the neural underpinnings of
the problem state bottleneck and to further validate our cognitive
model. To these ends, the model was used to generate a priori
predictions of hemodynamic activation patterns in five predefined
brain areas for a triple-task. Subsequently, an fMRI experiment
was conducted, and the model predictions were compared to the
data. Some of the predictions were confirmed, while others did not
match with the data. In general the results corroborate the model
and provide further evidence (see e.g., [6]) that the intraparietal
sulcus is a probably location for the problem state resource. In the
remainder of this paper we will first introduce the theory related to
the problem state bottleneck, followed by a description of the
experiment, the model, and the fMRI predictions. Finally, we will
discuss the correspondence between the predictions and the fMRI
data, and the implications for the problem state bottleneck
hypothesis.
The Problem State Bottleneck
The problem state resource is the part of working memory
responsible for storing intermediate representations in a task. For
instance, the problem state can be used to store an intermediate
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example is asking for driving directions, during which one needs
the problem state resource to store at which street one should turn
to arrive at the destination. Note that if the same information is
present in the world, that is, if one works out the algebra problem
on paper or follows road signs to the destination, it is not necessary
to maintain a problem state. An important functional character-
istic of the problem state resource is that its contents are directly
accessible for the task at hand. This in contrast to other elements
in working memory, which are only available at a time cost (e.g.,
[8]).
The concept of a central problem state resource originates from
a series of neuroimaging experiments by Anderson and colleagues,
who found that the Blood-Oxygen Level-Dependent (BOLD)
signal in the posterior parietal cortex correlates with the number of
transformations of mental representations (e.g., [6,9–11]).
Previously, we have conducted a number of experiments
investigating the nature of this resource [7,12]. These experiments
show that people can only maintain one problem state at a time.
When a problem state was required for more than one task,
performance decreased considerably, indicating a processing
bottleneck. To account for these results we constructed a cognitive
model based on the threaded cognition theory [2] and the
cognitive architecture ACT-R [13]. The model fits well to the data
(see the next section), further corroborating the hypothesis of a
problem state bottleneck as a plausible explanation of multitask
interference. The next section will discuss how the model was used
to generate fMRI predictions for the current study.
A Priori Model Predictions
To validate cognitive models, it is common practice to compare
model data to behavioral data. For instance, if response times and
accuracy scores correspond well between model and data, it is
assumed that a model gives a plausible explanation of the data.
However, many cognitive models have a complexity that cannot
be accounted for by using only behavioral measurements (e.g.,
[14,15]). One solution is to use predictions: first use a cognitive
model to predict the outcome of an experiment, and only conduct
the experiment afterwards ([16]; see for examples [17,18]).
Nevertheless, there are so many degrees of freedom in developing
a model that models are often under-constrained by behavioral
data. To increase the constraints on models that are developed in
the cognitive architecture ACT-R, a methodology was developed
for mapping model activity on brain activity (for a concise
explanation, see [19]). This way, models are not only constrained
by behavioral data, but also by neuroimaging data. The next
sections will describe how this methodology was used to generate a
priori neuroimaging predictions from our model. We will first
describe the experimental setup and the model itself, followed by
the actual predictions.
The triple task. The task for which we generate BOLD-
predictions is a triple task in which participants have to perform a
subtraction task, a text entry task, and a listening comprehension
task (similar to Experiment 3 in [7]). The subtraction and text
entry tasks both have an easy version for which maintaining a
problem state is not required to perform the task, and a hard
version for which maintaining a problem state is required to
perform the task correctly. In half of the trials, participants also
had to listen to a short story on which they were quizzed after the
trial. To measure baseline performance on the listening task, we
included an ‘Only Listening’ condition in which participants only
had to do the listening task. Thus, the experiment has a 26262+1
design (Subtraction Difficulty (easy/hard)6Text Entry Difficulty
(easy/hard)6Listening (yes/no)+Only Listening).
Figure 1 shows the graphical interface of the experiment. The
subtraction and text entry tasks were presented at the same time
on two different panels of the interface; participants had to
alternate between these tasks. After entering a digit in the
subtraction task, the subtraction panel was disabled, forcing the
participant to subsequently enter a letter. After entering a letter,
the text entry panel was disabled and the subtraction panel
became available again. In half of the trials, the listening task had
to be performed at the same time as the other two tasks. Thus, this
paradigm allows us to study both concurrent (listening and
subtraction/text entry), and sequential multitasking (alternating
between subtraction and text entry).
The interface for the subtraction task is shown in the left panel
of Figure 1. In the subtraction task participants had to solve multi-
column subtraction problems in standard right-to-left order.
However, at each point in time, only one column was visible.
Although the problems were presented column by column, the
participants were trained to perceive the separate columns in a
trial as one 10-column subtraction problem (in the practice phase
participants started out with a normal 10-column layout, only later
they switched to solving the problems column by column).
Participants had to enter the digits by clicking on the on-screen
keypad with the mouse. In the easy, no problem state version, the
upper digit was always larger or equal to the lower one; these
problems could be solved without ‘borrowing’. In contrast, the
hard version required participants to borrow six times out of 10
possible columns. The assumption, supported by the results of [7],
is that participants have to use their problem state resource to keep
track of whether a ‘borrowing’ is in progress.
The interface for the text entry task is shown on the right in
Figure 1. Participants had to enter 10-letter strings by clicking on
the on-screen keypad. In the easy version these strings were
presented one letter at a time and participants had to click the
corresponding button on the keypad. In the hard version, a 10-
letter word was presented once at the start of a trial. Once a
participant clicked on the first letter, the word disappeared and the
remaining letters had to be entered one at a time, without
feedback. Thus, after the initial presentation of the string in the
hard condition, participants could neither see what word they
were entering, nor what they had already entered. Results by [7]
provide evidence that participants use their problem state resource
to keep track of the process.
The listening comprehension task had to be performed during
half of the trials. This task consisted of listening to a short story
about which a multiple-choice question would be asked at the end
Figure 1. Interface of the experiment. Note that the disabled task
is masked by #-marks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g001
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accuracy feedback. According to existing models of language
processing in ACT-R, this task does not require maintenance of
problem states, but draws on different cognitive resources [20,21].
Furthermore, the listening task did not affect the problem state-
related outcomes of Experiment 3 in [7], also indicating an
absence of problem state usage. This, in turn, indicates that
problem state interference does not depend on the number of
tasks, but on the particular cognitive resources used by the tasks. In
the ‘only listening’ condition a fixation cross was shown instead of
the subtraction and text entry tasks.
Because participants had to alternate between the subtraction
and text entry tasks after every letter and digit, they had to
maintain intermediate state information for the other task (when it
was hard) while giving a response on the current task. Based on the
threaded cognition theory [2], we predicted that it is not possible
to maintain more than one problem state at a time, and therefore
expected to find interference when participants have to use a
problem state for both tasks. As the listening task was assumed not
to use the problem state resource, it was expected that problem
state interference was independent of the listening task.
The results of the behavioral experiment of [7] were as follows.
Response times were considerably higher and accuracy lower in
the hard subtraction – hard text entry condition than in the other
conditions. In fact, we found an interaction effect of Subtraction
Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty both in response times and
accuracy. The listening task had little behavioral effect; it was
limited to a small increase in response times in the subtraction task
when the listening task was added. Because the subtraction and
text entry tasks were performed sequentially, it is unlikely that the
observed interaction was caused by condition-specific differences
between the easy and hard conditions: only problem states had to
be maintained while doing the other task (see for a much more
elaborate discussion of these results [7] in particular Experiment
2). Thus, in line with the problem state bottleneck hypothesis, the
strongest interference occurred in the hard subtraction - hard text
entry condition, indicating that participants could not maintain
two problem states at the same time.
The cognitive model. To account for these results, a model
was developed in the cognitive architecture ACT-R, using the
threaded cognition theory to handle multitasking. First we will
introduce ACT-R and threaded cognition, followed by a
description of the model itself.
The cognitive architecture ACT-R [13] describes human
cognition as a set of independent modules – cognitive resources –
that interact through a central production system. For instance, it
uses visual and aural modules for perception and a motor module to
interact with the world. Besides these peripheral modules ACT-R
also has a number of central cognitive modules: the procedural
module that implements the central production system, the
declarative memory module, the goal module, and the problem
state module. All modules operate in parallel, but each module in
itself can only proceed serially [22]. Thus, the visual module can
only perceive one object at a time and the memory module can only
retrieve one fact at a time.
Threaded cognition [2,5,23] extends ACT-R by allowing
multiple tasks – called threads – to be active at the same time.
However, because the cognitive resources are serial in nature, the
key assumption of threaded cognition is that although several tasks
can be active at the same time, a particular resource can only be
used by a single task at a time, and thus acts as a bottleneck when
required by multiple tasks concurrently.
Of particular importance for the tasks at hand is ACT-R’s
problem state module. Although this module can hold a problem
state that is accessible at no time cost, changing or restoring a
problem state has been estimated to take a relatively long time (a
value of 200 ms has provided a good fit in previous ACT-R
models, and has been left unchanged in our models; e.g., [24,25]).
Because the problem state module can only hold one chunk of
information, the module’s contents have to be swapped when
multiple problem states are required. When a problem state is
replaced, the previous problem state remains available in long-
term memory, and it can be recalled when required. However, as
both retrieving an old problem state from declarative memory and
updating the problem state takes time, using multiple problem
states causes considerable interference. An additional effect of
swapping problem states is that because older problem states need
to be retrieved from memory, it is possible to retrieve an incorrect
problem state from memory, resulting in behavioral errors.
The model for the triple task consists of three independent
threads, one for the subtraction task, one for the text entry task,
and one for the listening task. The subtraction and text entry
threads use the visual module to perceive the stimuli and the
manual module to operate the mouse. In the easy condition of the
subtraction task, the model perceives the digits, retrieves a fact
from memory (e.g., 522=3) and clicks on the corresponding
button. The procedure is the same in the hard condition, up to the
point when borrowing becomes necessary. When the model
retrieves a fact from memory and notices that the outcome is
negative (e.g., 326=23), the model will add 10 to the upper
term, retrieve a new fact (1326=7), and store in its problem state
that a ‘borrowing’ is in progress. The model will then check the
problem state every time the subtraction task is resumed. If a
‘borrowing’ is in progress, the model first subtracts 1 from the
upper term before the initial retrieval is made.
In the easy version of the text entry task, the model perceives the
letter and clicks on the corresponding button. In the hard version,
the model has to know the target word and the current position
within that word. This information is stored in the problem state
resource (e.g. ‘‘‘university’, 4th letter’’). At each step, the model
uses this information to determine the next letter. To simulate the
spelling processes, we implemented an additional declarative
retrieval that links the current position to the next letter. Although
this is a very simplified implementation of the spelling process, it
was not necessary to model this aspect of the task in more details
since no effects of spelling difficulty are to be expected on the
problem state. After the model has determined the next letter, it
clicks the appropriate button and updates the problem state to
reflect that it is one position further in the word.
The listening task was modeled as a third thread. This thread
aurally perceives words, retrieves lexical information related to the
auditory input from memory, and builds syntactic trees. The same
approach was used by [2] to model the classical reading and
dictation study of [26], and by [27] and [28] to account for
developmental patterns in children’s ability to process pronouns.
For each incoming word in the auditory module, four processing
steps are taken, and two facts are retrieved from memory. This
results in about 320 ms processing time per word, fast enough to
keep up with the average speaking rate of 359 ms/word in the
presented texts (note that the model is capable of listening to
speech faster than 320 ms/word, because the auditory module can
already start perceiving a word while other cognitive modules are
processing the previous word). The process of answering the
multiple-choice questions was not modeled, because modeling the
comprehension of a question would have required linguistic
processing capabilities at a level of complexity that is beyond the
scope of the model. However, the model visually parses the
questions when they appear on the screen.
fMRI Study of Problem States
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In the hard – hard condition a problem state is needed for both the
subtraction and the text entry task. This means that the contents of
the problem state resource have to be replaced on each step in a
trial, increasing response times considerably. Because this is only
necessary in the hard – hard condition, the model predicts an
over-additive effect of task difficulty on response times. The
number of errors will also increase with task difficulty, because
older and incorrect problem states are sometimes retrieved. As the
model does not use the problem state resource for the listening
task, no influence of the listening task on problem state
interference is predicted.
Figure 2 shows how the model uses cognitive resources over the
course of a trial (that is, entering 10 digits and 10 letters). The four
panels show four different trial types, ranging from easy
subtraction – easy text entry at the top to hard – hard at the
bottom (all without the listening task). Boxes indicate that a
cognitive resource is in use. A first observation is that the length of
the model traces increases with task difficulty: response times
increase when the tasks get more difficult. Second, the use of the
problem state resource and declarative memory also increases with
task difficulty, with an over-additive increase in the hard – hard
condition because of the problem state bottleneck. Finally, the use
of the manual and visual resources is more or less constant over the
different trial types, but gets more spread out in the more difficult
conditions. That is, participants have to make the same number of
responses in each condition, but because response times are higher
these responses are spaced further apart.
The model fit well to the behavioral data from [7]: it fit both the
interaction effects in the response times (average R
2 of .99) and in
the accuracy data (average R
2 of .95; for details see [7]). The same
model was used previously to account for the data of two other
Figure 2. Cognitive resource usage of the model for four trial types. Time goes from left to right; boxes indicate activity of a cognitive
resource. Note that only trials are depicted without the listening task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g002
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data. In the next section we will describe how we used the same
model to generate fMRI predictions for the current experiment.
The fMRI predictions. As mentioned above, the cognitive
architecture ACT-R can predict fMRI data, or to be more precise,
the BOLD response (e.g., [13,19]). The modules of ACT-R have
been mapped onto specific regions in the brain (see Table 1), and
are assumed to predict activation in that region. The most
important modules and associated brain regions for the current
model are listed in Table 1.
ACT-R’s modules are not constantly in use during the
execution of a model, but operate for short periods of time (in
the order of hundreds of ms). The assumption is that when a
module is active the BOLD response increases in the associated
brain region. The BOLD response of a certain event is modeled by
a gamma function, as is customary in fMRI research (e.g., [29–
31]):
H(t)~m
t
s
   a
e{(t=s)
where t is the age of the event, m determines the magnitude of the
BOLD curve, s the time scale, and a the shape. If D(t) is a 0–1
demand function that indicates whether a module is active at time
t, the BOLD activation at time t can be calculated by convolving
D(t) with the gamma function:
B(t)~D(t)6H(t)~
ð t
0
D(t)H(t{t)dt
Because the predictions were made before the experiment was run,
the gamma function parameters were not fit to data but were set to
default ACT-R values (s=.75, a=6). The scaling parameter (m)
was left at 1 (note that therefore only the shape of the predictions is
of interest, not the magnitude).
It should be noted that we do not assume that modules in ACT-
R cause activation in only these regions, nor that activation in
these regions is only due to the associated ACT-R modules.
However, these regions have been the best indicators of activation
in the ACT-R modules over an extended series of studies (see also
http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/mri and [13]).
The predictions were made using the model described above,
adapted for the fMRI-suitable interface of the current experiment.
While the experiment is in essence the same as Experiment 3 in [7],
some changes were made to the interface to make it suitable for the
fMRI scanner. First, in the current experiment, participants were
told beforeeach trial what the conditions ofthe differenttasks would
be to reduce noise in the fMRI measurements. This was most
relevant in the difficult subtraction condition, as in the experiments
in [7] participants only discovered during a trial that a subtraction
required ‘borrowing’. Second, all responses had to be made using
the mouse (instead of the keyboard). Finally the interface was made
more compact to reduce eye- and head movements.
We discuss predictions for the five most interesting modules of
the current model: the problem state module, the declarative
memory module, the manual module, the visual module, and the
aural module (Figures 3–7; note that these predictions are based
on module demand traces similar to those shown in Figure 2). On
the left side of each figure the location and the MNI coordinates of
the particular module are shown. The three graphs in the center of
each figure show the model predictions; the three graphs on the
right the fMRI data (which will be discussed in the ‘Results’
section). The four line graphs show the BOLD response over a
complete trial (i.e., entering 10 digits and 10 letters, and in the case
of the listening task answering the multiple-choice question). The
x-axis of these graphs represents time in the form of scans (1
scan=2 seconds); the y-axis percent BOLD change (as compared
to the average of the first two scans in a trial). The two line graphs
at the top show the four conditions when the listening task was
present, together with the ‘only listening’ condition. The two line
graphs in the middle show the four conditions without the listening
task. Finally, the two bar graphs show the area under the curve of
the BOLD graphs, indicating the total time a module is active and
thus the total activation in a brain area during a trial (as it is
sensitive to both the magnitude and the duration of the response,
see [6,32]). We will now discuss the most important predictions;
lower-level predictions for each module will be discussed in the
results section alongside the experimental results.
The experiment and the model were developed to investigate the
problem state bottleneck. The most important prediction is
therefore related to the problem state resource and its associated
brain area, the intraparietal sulcus. The model claims that the
problem state has to be swapped at every step in a trial in the hard –
hard condition. In the other conditions, the problem state is either
not used at all (the easy – easy condition), or used only for one of the
tasks(easy–hardand hard– easy).Therefore,themodelpredictsno
BOLD activity in the easy – easy condition, intermediate levels in
the easy – hard and hard – easy conditions, and the most activity in
the hard – hard condition (Figure 3; cf. Figure 2). In fact, as the area
under the curve reflects the total time that a module is active, an
over-additive interaction effect is predicted in the intraparietal
sulcus. Because the declarative memory module is used to retrieve
the old problem state on each step in a trial in the hard – hard
condition, a similar interaction effect is predicted for the declarative
memory module (Figure 4).
For the manual module (Figure 5), opposite patterns are
predicted, with highest BOLD peaks occurring in the easier
conditions. This may seem odd, because participants have to make
Table 1. ACT-R modules and associated brain regions.
ACT-R Module Brain Region (left hemisphere) Size (voxels) Talairach-Tournoux Coordinates MNI Coordinates
Aural Sec. auditory cortex (BA 21/22/42) 56565 245, 222, 9 248, 221, 7
Manual Precentral gyrus (BA 3) 56564 242, 220, 50 242, 223, 54
Visual Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 56564 241, 261, 29 243, 260, 216
Problem State Intraparietal sulcus (BA 7/39/40) 56564 224, 263, 40 224, 267, 44
Declarative Memory Inferior frontal sulcus (BA 45/46) 56564 242, 23, 24 243, 24, 25
Voxels are 36363mm. MNI=Montreal Neurological Institute.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.t001
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response times are longer in the more difficult conditions, the
BOLD response has more time to decay between each response (see
also Figure 2). Therefore, the curves are lower but broader in the
more difficult conditions, and higher and narrower in the easier
conditions: the area under the curve is equal in all conditions. A
similar pattern is predicted for the visual module (Figure 6).
However, more visual activity is predicted for the hard subtraction
condition than for the easy subtraction condition, because the
model has to look multiple times at the digits to process the
‘borrowings’. With respect to the aural module (Figure 7),the model
obviously predicts no activity in the non-listening conditions, and
sustained levels of activity in the listening conditions.
To summarize, the model does not predict a general increase in
BOLD response with task difficulty; instead, it predicts lower but
more persistent activation levels for the more difficult conditions in
the visual and manual modules, and higher and more persistent
activation levels for the more difficult conditions in the problem
state and declarative memory modules. In the next section the
fMRI experiment is described that was carried out to test those
predictions.
Methods
Experimental Procedures
The design of the experiment is described in ‘A Priori Predictions –
The Triple Task’ and Footnote 3. The participants performed the
experiment in three sessions. The first session was a practice session,
in which the participants were familiarized with the task, and trained
for about 30 minutes. The next day the first of two fMRI sessions of
Figure 3. Model predictions and BOLD results for the problem state module. Please note that the green line is hidden behind the black line
in the upper left graph.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g003
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few days later (on average 3.3 days after the first session, range 1–9
days). The two fMRI sessions were identical.
Participants. Thirteen students of Carnegie Mellon
University participated in the experiment. Three of them had to
be excluded: one for falling asleep in the MRI scanner, one for
ignoring the listening task, and one for fMRI recording problems,
which leaves 10 complete datasets (3 women, average age 21.9,
range 19–28, right-handed). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Written
informed consent as approved by the Institutional Review
Boards at Carnegie Mellon University and the University of
Pittsburgh was obtained before the experiment. Participants
received US$ 100 compensation for performing the practice
session and the two experimental sessions.
Stimuli. The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated
anew for each participant. The subtraction problems in the hard
version always featured six ‘borrowings’, and resulted in 10-digit
answers. The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text entry
task were handpicked from a list of high-frequency English words
(CELEX database) to ensure that similarities between words were
kept at a minimum. These stimuli were also used in the easy text
entry task, except that the letters within the words were scrambled
(under the constraint that a letter never appeared twice in a row).
Thus, participants were presented pseudo-random sequences of
letters that they had to enter one-by-one in the easy condition. By
scrambling the words, we controlled for letter-based effects, while
preventing the use of strategies to predict the next letter.
The audio recordings and questions for the listening task were
taken from four English listening comprehension exams (university
Figure 4. Model predictions and BOLD results for the declarative memory module. Please note the green line hidden behind the black line
in the upper left graph.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g004
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Arnhem). The story length ranged between 26 and 72 seconds
(M=52.6, SD=9.7). The multiple-choice questions, which
participants only saw after hearing the text, had three options.
These questions could be answered without making inferences, but
did require attention for the complete duration of the story.
During the practice session, the experiment was presented full
screen on a 170 monitor. The width of the interface measured
20 cm; the overall height 9 cm (see also Figure 1). Participants
were sitting at a normal viewing distance, about 75 cm from the
screen. The stories were presented via speakers, of which
participants could control the volume using the keyboard. During
the experimental sessions, the experiment was projected on a
screen in the MRI scanner, allowing the participants to view the
experiment via a set of mirrors attached to the head coil. The
interface was operated through a normal computer mouse using
the right hand. The listening task was presented via fMRI-
compatible headphones, reducing scanner noise to allow the
participants to hear the stories. Participants could change the
volume of the stories using the mouse wheel.
Procedure. Eachtrialstartedwiththepresentationofafixation
cross,followed bytwo colored circles indicating thedifficulty levelsof
the tasks (on the left for the subtraction task, on the right for the text
entry task; a green circle for easy, a red circle for hard, two open
circles for the ‘only listening’ condition). If the listening task was
present, a short beep sounded when the circles were displayed. The
circlesstayedonthe screen for5 seconds,followedbya fixationcross
for 1 second. Afterwards, the subtraction and text entry tasks
appeared and, in case of the listening task, the story started.
Participants always begun with the subtraction task, and then
alternated between the two tasks. After completing both tasks, a
feedback screen was shown for 3 seconds, indicating how many
Figure 5. Model predictions and BOLD results for the manual module.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g005
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after the story was finished, the multiple-choice question was
displayed. When the participants clicked on an answer, a feedback
screen was shown for 4 seconds. The experiment was slow event-
related, with trials separated by long breaks whose duration was
sampled from a uniform distribution between 13 and 17 seconds.
The onset of the circles as well as the onset of the tasks was
synchronized with the beginning of a volume acquisition.
The practice session consisted of 13 single task trials, followed by a
block of 9 multitask trials: all combinations of subtraction and text entry
in combination with the listening task (4 trials: easy-easy, hard-easy,
easy-hard, and hard-hard), without the listening task (4 trials), and one
‘only listening’ trial. Both experimental sessions consisted of 5 multitask
trial blocks and of one practice block at the start of a session, to re-
familiarize participants with the task (this was performed during the
acquisition of structural images, allowing the participants to get
habituated to the environment and to adapt the listening-volume
before the experimental trials). Trials were randomized within a block;
stimuli were randomized over the two experimental sessions. The
complete experiment (two sessions) consisted of 90 experimental trials.
After each block participants could take a short break.
fMRI Procedures and Preprocessing
The fMRI data were collected with a Siemens 3T Allegra
Scanner using a standard radio frequency head coil. Each
functional volume existed of 34 axial slices (3.2 mm thickness,
64664 matrix, 3.12563.125 mm per voxel), acquired using echo-
planar imaging (2000 ms TR, 30 ms TE, 79u flip angle, 200 mm
field of view, 0 slice gap, with AC-PC on the 11
th slice from the
bottom). Functional acquisition was event-related; scanning onset
was synchronized with stimulus onset as described above.
Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted spin-echo
Figure 6. Model predictions and BOLD results for the visual module.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g006
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with a finer resolution (3.2 mm thickness, 200 mm field of view,
2566256 matrix, 0.7812560.78125 mm in-plane resolution).
The data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). This in-
cluded realigning the functional images, coregistering them with
the structural images, normalizing the images to the MNI
(Montreal Neurological Institute) ICBM 152 template, and
smoothing them with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The
MarsBaR toolbox [33] was used to extract the time course
information in predefined regions.
Results
We will first discuss the behavioral results, followed by the fMRI
region-of-interest results. An exploratory fMRI analysis was also
performed, which confirmed the existence of peaks of activations
in the standard ACT-R regions-of-interest (see Text S1 and Tables
S1, S2, and S3 for more details). All reported F- and p-values are
from repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVAs), all error
bars depict standard errors, effects were judged significant when a
.05 significance level was reached, and accuracy data were
transformed using an arcsine transformation before performing
ANOVAs.
Behavioral Results
Outliers in response times were eliminated by means of a two
step procedure. First, response times faster than 250 ms and
slower than 10,000 ms were removed. Then, data exceeding 3
standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant
were excluded. Overall, 2.4% of the data was discarded. Table 2
(text entry) and Table 3 (subtraction) summarize the results.
Figure 7. Model predictions and BOLD results for the aural module.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g007
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the text entry task, on the left without and on the right in
combination with the listening task. A response time on the text
entry task was defined as the time between entering a digit in the
subtraction task and entering a letter in the text entry task. The
first responses of each trial were removed (per task), as they might
contain ‘start-up’ effects. An ANOVA showed that all three main
effects were significant (see Table 2), indicating that response times
decreased with Text Entry Difficulty, but increased with
Subtraction Difficulty and Listening. The interaction between
Subtraction Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty also reached
significance, which is due to the increased response times in the
hard-hard condition, as was predicted. The three-way interaction
did not reach significance.
The lower panels of Figure 8 show the response times on the
subtraction task. This is the time between clicking a button in the
text entry task and entering a digit in the subtraction task. Again,
the first response of each trial was removed. Only the main effects
of Subtraction Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty reached
significance (see Table 3), showing an increase in response times
for both effects. The interaction of Subtraction Difficulty and Text
Entry Difficulty did not reach significance, nor did any effects
involving the listening task.
Figure 9 shows the accuracy on the subtraction and text entry
tasks (the ANOVA results are listed in Table 2 and 3). The two top
panels show the accuracy on the text entry task. All three main
effects reached significance, all three indicating a decrease in
accuracy. As predicted, when both the subtraction and the text
entry task were hard, accuracy decreased even more, which is
shown by the significant interaction between Subtraction Difficulty
and Text Entry Difficulty. The other effects did not reach
significance. The lower panels of Figure 9 show the accuracy on
the subtraction task. The main effect of Subtraction Difficulty was
significant, as was the interaction between Subtraction Difficulty
and Text Entry Difficulty. The other tests did not reach
significance.
Figure 10 shows the accuracy on the listening task. One of the
stories was removed because participants’ accuracy was at chance
level. Only the main effect of Subtraction Difficulty reached
significance (F(1,9)=18.09, p=.002, gp
2=.67), caused by a
decrease in accuracy when subtraction was hard. The other
effects were not significant (Text Entry Difficulty: F,1; Subtrac-
tion Difficulty6Text Entry Difficulty: F(1,9)=1.29, p=.28,
gp
2=.13).
Discussion. The results were as expected: the interaction
effect of Subtraction Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty was
significant for the response times of the text entry task and for the
accuracy scores of both tasks. Thus, when a problem state was
required for both tasks (the hard - hard condition), response times
increased and accuracy decreased, as was predicted by the model.
The fact that this interaction did not reach significance
(F(1,9)=2.7, p=.13, gp
2=.23) for the response times of the
subtraction task is probably due to the lower number of
participants than in previous experiments, in which the effect
was always significant [7]. Furthermore, compared to previous
experiments, response times were slightly higher. This difference is
probably due to performing the experiment in the scanner and
using the mouse.
The pattern of response times of the text entry task was slightly
different than in the previous experiment (Experiment 3 of [7]):
response times were lower in the hard version of the text entry task
than in the easy version. The explanation is that participants have
to do two different actions to determine the next letter to type in
the text entry task: in the easy version they have to look at the
letter that they need to type, and in the hard version they have to
mentally determine the next letter to type given the word and
position. In earlier experiments these two actions happened to take
approximately the same amount of time, but in the current
experiment the action for the easy version of the task turned out to
be slower, probably due to the slightly different interface that we
used in this experiment. We have observed similar effects before,
for instance in Experiment 2 of [7].
To ensure that the fMRI experiment is comparable to our
earlier studies, we ran the same experiment outside the scanner.
This yielded similar results as reported in [7], including the
decrease of response times for the hard text entry task, indicating
that the observed differences are not due to the minor changes in
the task interface. That is, the fact that the interaction effect did
not reach significance is probably caused by the low number of
participants, and the slightly different pattern of results by
performing the task lying in the scanner and operating the mouse
in this setup. This suggests that the experiment still taps the same
underlying cognitive constructs and that it is therefore comparable
to our previous studies. For details see Text S2, Figures S1 and S2,
and Tables S4 and S5.
The model did not predict the effect of the listening task on the
text entry task, neither the small increase in response time nor the
small decrease in accuracy. As this is not the focus of the current
paper, we did not pursue this issue further. The effect of the
subtraction task on the listening task accuracy, Figure 10, is
explained by the model: When the subtraction task is hard, there is
a high demand for declarative memory, causing the model to not
Table 2. ANOVA results of the text entry task.
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Listening 10.69 .010 .54 10.37 .010 .54
Subtraction 32.43 ,.001 .78 8.72 .016 .49
Text Entry 5.67 .041 .39 32.17 ,.001 .78
Listening6Subtraction ,1 - - 1.60 .24 .15
Listening6Text Entry ,1- -,1- -
Subtraction6Text Entry 12.08 .007 .57 10.35 .01 .53
Listening6Sub.6Text Entry ,1- -,1- -
Subtraction=Subtraction Difficulty, Text Entry=Text Entry Difficulty.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.t002
Table 3. ANOVA results of the subtraction task.
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Listening 1.58 .24 .15 ,1- -
Subtraction 83.82 ,.001 .90 80.96 ,.001 .90
Text Entry 5.40 .045 .38 4.34 .067 .33
Listening6Subtraction ,1 - - 1.44 .26 .14
Listening6Text Entry ,1 - - 2.81 .13 .24
Subtraction6Text Entry 2.70 .13 .23 14.05 .005 .61
Listening6Sub.6Text Entry 1.47 .26 .14 ,1- -
Subtraction=Subtraction Difficulty, Text Entry=Text Entry Difficulty.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.t003
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memory is also required). This could then lead to more mistakes in
answering the questions (see [7] for a more extensive discussion of
this issue).
fMRI Results: Regions-Of-Interest
To analyze the effects in the predefined regions, we first
transformed the Talairach-Tournoux coordinates used in previous
ACT-R/fMRI papers (e.g., [13]) to the MNI coordinates reported
in Table 1 using a non-linear mapping (see [34]). The smoothed
functional images were proportionally and grand mean scaled
(with a grand mean of 100) using SPM. The BOLD response was
then calculated as percent signal change as compared to the first
two scans of a trial. Trials belonging to the same participant, brain
area, and condition were averaged together. Because the area
under the curve reflects the total activity of a brain area (see
[6,32]), we entered this value into an ANOVA. We only took the
area between the start of a trial and the behavioral feedback
screens into account, because the tails of the BOLD curves contain
the multiple-choice questions. These could obscure the results and
were not included in the ACT-R model (except for the passive act
of reading the words on the screen). Table 4 contains the results;
Table S6 shows which scans were taken into account for the
different conditions.
Results. The most important prediction of the model was an
over-additive interaction effect in the intraparietal sulcus,
reflecting the problem state bottleneck. Figure 3 shows the
results in the intraparietal sulcus: most activation is indeed
observed for the hard – hard condition. The ANOVA of the
area under the curve shows that the interaction between
Subtraction Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty is significant in
combination with the listening task, but not without it (see Table 4).
Furthermore, the main effects of Subtraction Difficulty and Text
Entry Difficulty are significant with and without the Listening task.
The model prediction that there is no activation for the easy – easy
condition did not come true, but the prediction that the problem
state resource is not used for the listening task – except for
answering the multiple-choice question – is reflected by the data.
Figure 4 shows the results of the prefrontal cortex, associated
with the retrieval module. For this region the model also predicted
an over-additive interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and
Text Entry Difficulty, which was not found in the data. The model
also predicted main effects of both Subtraction Difficulty and Text
Entry Difficulty and these effects were indeed found (Text Entry
Figure 8. Response times on the subtraction and text entry tasks. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g008
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tion Difficulty both with and without listening).
In contrast to the problem state and declarative memory
modules, we expected a higher BOLD response peak for the easier
conditions in the manual and visual areas. Indeed, in the motor
cortex – associated with the manual module – the BOLD curve
reached its highest activation levels in the easy – easy condition
(Figure 5). The more difficult the condition, the lower and broader
the activation curves. The model predicted no effects on the total
activity; this was confirmed by the data.
At first sight, the match between model and empirical data for
the fusiform gyrus (Figure 6), associated with the visual module,
seems less convincing. However, a more careful analysis shows
that the same patterns are observed in both model and data. The
model predicted an effect of Subtraction Difficulty on activation in
the fusiform gyrus, as the digits have to be visually attended to
multiple times in the hard condition to solve the ‘borrowings’. This
is confirmed by the ANOVA that compared the area under the
curve between the easy and difficult conditions. While the model
also predicted a small decrease of visual activation in the hard text
entry conditions (because in the hard condition the word only had
to be read at the first step of a trial, while in the easy condition a
letter had to be processed at each step of a trial), this was not found
in the data. Finally, the model predicted a peak of activation
around scan 40 caused by reading the multiple-choice questions;
this was reflected in the data.
Figure 7 illustrates the results for the auditory cortex. As
expected, when the listening task was not present, the BOLD
response was absent. When the listening task was present, on the
other hand, a clear BOLD response was found. The model
predicted this effect, and additionally predicted a small effect of
condition. The cause of this effect is that to process each word that
the model hears, it has to retrieve multiple facts from declarative
memory. In the more difficult subtraction and text entry
conditions, these tasks also make heavy demands on declarative
memory. When declarative memory is busy, the model can
sometimes not process a word right away, which results in missing
some words in the auditory stream. Thus, the more difficult the
subtraction and text entry conditions, the higher the demands on
declarative memory, the more words are missed, and the lower the
predicted BOLD response for the secondary auditory cortex (as
this region reflects processing auditory information, not passive
listening). A similar effect seems to be present in the data, but did
not reach significance.
Figure 9. Accuracy on the subtraction and text entry tasks. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g009
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conditions would show lower but broader activation curves in the
visual and manual regions, and higher and broader curves in the
problem state and declarative memory conditions, was confirmed
by the data. Furthermore, the over-additive interaction effect in
the problem state region was present in the fMRI data (in
combination with the listening task), supporting the theory that the
problem state bottleneck is localized in the intraparietal sulcus.
This interaction effect was not found in the declarative memory
region (see the General Discussion for an extensive discussion of
this issue). In the aural region the predictions were confirmed in
general: a BOLD response in the listening conditions, mediated by
the conditions of the subtraction and text entry tasks. However,
these effects did not reach significance.
Discussion
The current study was performed to investigate the neural
correlates of problem states and the problem state bottleneck, and
to validate our theory using neuroimaging data. First, we
generated a priori fMRI predictions for five brain areas using our
model, which were subsequently tested in an experiment. This
resulted in two main predictions: (1) an over-additive interaction
effect in the problem state region (the intraparietal sulcus) and in
the declarative memory region (a part of the prefrontal cortex),
and (2) lower and broader BOLD curves for the more difficult
conditions in the manual and visual regions, and higher and
broader BOLD curves for the more difficult conditions in the
problem state and declarative memory regions. The first
prediction came true for the problem state region, but not for
the declarative memory region, while the counter-intuitive second
prediction was confirmed by the experiment.
In general, the model’s fMRI predictions for this complex task
were accurate. The paper focuses mainly on the overall BOLD
response inthe regions (area under the curve). The figures also report
the time course of the BOLD response over a trial together with the
corresponding model predictions. Here the fit between the scan-by-
scan data points and the model is more modest, which can be
explained bythe factthat we made ap r i o r ipredictions, and did not try
to fit the curves post-hoc. A number of factors might be called into
question. First, ACT-R uses only a simple gamma function, identical
for every module, to predict the BOLD response in each region.
However, the biological hemodynamic response function is more
complex than that, and varies in different parts of the brain (e.g.,
[35]). Choosing different functions and fitting their parameters for
each region separately would probably result in a better model-data
match. Second, due to the duration of our experimental paradigm,
only a relatively small number of observations for each condition was
available for each participant. This small number of observations
might not be able to cancel the scan-to-scan variations of noise in the
MRI signal, thus making the true shape of the observed BOLD
curves difficult to estimate. Third, the model might be underestimat-
ing some trial-by-trial variability in the subjects’ responses. In
particularly long trials, the BOLD response in a region might
cumulate over the interval between trials and carry over to the scans
chosen as a baseline for the successive trial. The fact that certain
BOLD curves (especially in Figures 4 and 5) do not return to baseline
s u g g e s t st h a tt h i sk i n do fc o n t a m i n a t i o nw a si n d e e do c c u r r i n g ,
possibly corrupting the true shape of the BOLD curves.
It should be noted that, while all these factors can affect the
shape of the BOLD response, none of them should significantly
impact our predictions on the relative magnitudes of the areas
under the curve. Therefore we choose to focus on the predictive
power of the model and its principal predictions. In combination
with the behavioral evidence that we gathered before [7], the
observed global effects on the BOLD response suggest that the
hypothesized existence of a problem state bottleneck can explain
the interference effects in the data.
The most important predictionof the model was an over-additive
interaction effect in the problem state region. While this effect was
indeed present in the data in combination with the listening task, it
did not reach significance in the trials without the listening task. The
main reason for this is that while the model predicted no activity in
the problem state region for the easy-easy condition, the
experimental data does show increased activity in this condition.
One possible explanation is that the observed activity was caused by
visually processing the stimuli, as the same parietal region is known
to be involved in visual-spatial processing (e.g., [36]). Not only
would this lead to an effect in the easy-easy condition, but also
obscure the effects in the other conditions. In combination with
non-linear properties of the BOLD response (e.g., [37–39]), this
could explain why we did not observe the interaction effect here,
especially taken into account the relatively low number of
participants. Another possibility is that participants use their
problem state resources in the easy-easy condition to represent
information, even if this is not required by the task. This would lead
to neural activity in the easy-easy condition, again canceling the
interaction effect. The additional load of the listening task could
have prevented the use of problem state resource (see, for similar
effects, [25]), which could explain why we did find the interaction
effect in the context of the listening task. However, as the model has
successfully accounted for data of three experiments [7], we do
believe that the basic mechanisms of the model are sound, and
decided against post-hoc changes to the model.
The prefrontal region corresponding to the declarative memory
module exhibits the predicted main effects of subtraction difficulty
Figure 10. Accuracy on the listening task. Error bars represent
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.g010
fMRI Study of Problem States
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 14 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12966and text entry difficulty (except for Text Entry Difficulty when the
listening task was present). This supports the hypothesis that this
predefined region indeed represents an area involved in the
processing of declarative memory elements (such as subtraction
facts).However,wedidnotfind the predicted interactioneffect.The
interaction effect wassupposedtobecausedbyencodingofproblem
states (on top of retrieving subtraction facts). Even though the
predefined area is known to be active when intentionally encoding
facts and even when unintentionally encoding facts (e.g., [40]), the
experiment did not provide evidence that it is actually used to
encode suspended problem states. Therefore, either this region’s
contribution to the processing problem states was too weak to
impact the BOLD signal, or the retrieval of suspended problem
states is controlled by a different region.
With respect to the first option (i.e., the contribution to the signal
being too weak) one must note that the predictions made by our
model were based on the assumption that both retrieving a previous
problem state from declarative memory and swapping it into the
problem state module require some measurable cost in terms of
time.Whenthemodelwasfittothe behavioraldata of[7],thesetwo
costs had to be estimated together, with no possibility of
disentangling them. However, it is conceivable that the retrieval
time for a problem state is very short, and that most of the time is
due to the swapping process. Under such circumstances, the model
would still predict the over-additive effects of task difficulty for the
problem state region, but not for the retrieval region. In fact, there
are at least two reasons why the retrieval time for problem states
should be very short. The first reason is recency: the problem state
that needs to be retrieved has been swapped out of its module only a
few seconds before, and it is probably still active in memory.
Second, the retrieval of appropriate problem states can be easily
cued by task-relevant, on-screen information. In both cases, there is
no reason to expect a significant effect of problem state retrievals on
the prefrontal region. In fact, the pattern of data in Figure 5 (lower
half) suggests that main factor affecting the response of the retrieval
region is the difficulty of the subtraction task. Thus, although the
Table 4. ANOVA results of the area under the curve of the regions-of-interest.
Problem State Module – Intraparietal Sulcus
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Subtraction 60.20 ,.001 .87 20.89 .001 .70
Text Entry 6.49 .031 .42 10.39 .010 .54
Subtraction6Text Entry 5.15 .049 .36 ,1- -
Declarative Memory Module – Prefrontal Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Subtraction 11.73 .008 .57 7.53 .023 .46
Text Entry ,1 - - 9.81 .012 .52
Subtraction6Text Entry 2.03 .19 .18 ,1- -
Manual Module – Motor Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Subtraction ,1 - - 3.51 .09 .28
Text Entry 1.85 .207 .17 ,1- -
Subtraction6Text Entry ,1- - ,1- -
Visual Module – Fusiform Gyrus
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Subtraction 11.52 .008 .56 11.12 .009 .55
Text Entry 3.00 .117 .25 4.06 .075 .31
Subtraction6Text Entry 2.42 .154 .21 1.35 .276 .13
Aural Module – Secondary Auditory Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p gp
2 F(1,9) p gp
2
Subtraction ,1 - - 3.32 .102 .27
Text Entry 2.00 .191 .18 1.39 .269 .13
Subtraction6Text Entry ,1- - ,1- -
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012966.t004
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it was not an inevitable prediction and its lack does not undermine
the plausibility of our framework.
On the basis of previous ACT-R/fMRI research, the model
predicted that the problem state resource – and thus the effect of
the bottleneck – is located in the intraparietal sulcus. This notion is
supported by the current results: the predicted interaction effect
caused by the problem state bottleneck was found in this region.
This region is part of the fronto-parietal network that is
consistently found in neuro-imaging studies of working memory.
While the intraparietal sulcus is mostly implicated in spatial
working memory and spatial attention tasks, it is also known to be
responsible for object and verbal working memory (among other
regions, e.g., [41,42]). In our study, the problem states did not
contain spatial information, and therefore confirms a more general
role of the intraparietal sulcus for working memory.
In the hard subtraction task the problem state resource
contained numerical information, that is, information whether a
‘borrowing’ is in process. It is not surprising that this leads to
increased activation in the intraparietal sulcus, as the horizontal
part of the intraparietal sulcus is one of the three circuits for
numerical processing as identified by [43]. In the hard text entry
task, the problem state is used to maintain verbal information.
Brodmann Area 40, a region bordering on the intraparietal sulcus,
is known to be involved in verbal working memory, specifically in
maintaining verbal working memory (e.g., [44]), and it is thus also
not surprising that this region is involved in maintaining the
problem state for the text entry task. While slightly different
regions are implicated for storage of different kinds of information,
this study suggests that maintaining more than one problem state
of any kind at a time results in significant interference.
The current results also seem to suggest that the problem state is
modality-specific. The subtraction and text entry task elicit
activation in the intraparietal sulcus even when they are easy
(while a problem state is not required), and interfere with each
other in the hard – hard condition. The listening task, on the other
hand, hardly causes activation in the intraparietal sulcus (as shown
by the ‘only listening’ condition), nor does it cause multitasking
interference. As the listening task is the only non-visual task, this
could imply that the intraparietal sulcus is only involved in
maintaining visual problem states (cf. [45]).
In the current mapping scheme of ACT-R processes to brain
regions, the problem state predicts activation as a function of
problem state transformations, but not in reaction to storing
problem states. This may seem odd, as storing problem states
should also have metabolic costs. In practice, however, the two
processes of storing and manipulating are difficult to separate, (as
storing always follows a problem state manipulation) and previous
research (see e.g., [13]) has led to estimated costs for transforma-
tions only, assuming that representations persist at no additional
metabolic cost. Therefore, we decided to keep our model as
parsimonious as possible and not to introduce ad-hoc estimates of
the storing costs for problem states.
Our model is based on threaded cognition [2,5,23], a theory of
multitasking that assumes multiple central and peripheral process-
ing bottlenecks. This in contrast to for instance the EPIC theory
[46], which assumes only peripheral bottlenecks, and the central
bottleneck theory of [47], which assumes only a single central
bottleneck. While brain evidence for a central bottleneck in the
frontal lobes has been reported before (e.g., [48]), the current fMRI
results give evidence for an additional central bottleneck located in
the intraparietal sulcus, corroborating multiple-bottleneck theories.
In conclusion, this study lends additional support to the notion of
the problem state bottleneck. This bottleneck can cause consider-
able interference not only in concurrent multitasking – as most
bottlenecks – but also in sequential multitasking: When multiple
alternating tasks need to store intermediate results, the problem
state bottleneck will cause significant interference. Take for instance
the prototypical example of taking a phone call while working on a
paper: if you had a sentence in mind before taking the call, you will
almost certainly have forgotten about it after the call.
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